Philosophy of Perception

Fall 2007

 

 

 

Course: PHIL 662

Time: Weds 4:30-6:30

Location: Goldwin Smith 144

 

Instructor: Nico Silins

Office: 219 Goldwin Smith Hall

Office Hours: Wednesdays 10:00-11:30 or (easily) by appointment

Email: ns338@cornell.edu

 

 

 

Course Description

 

A selective survey of recent work on the metaphysics and epistemology of visual experience.  Our main questions will be: (1) what are visual experiences? and (2) how do visual experiences justify beliefs?

 

Texts

 

There are no required books, but I recommend buying Michael TyeÕs Consciousness, Color, and Content, as well as Tamar Gendler and John HawthorneÕs Perceptual Experience.  Both are available at amazon.com and elsewhere.

 

Requirements

 

¥ A short critical paper of 7-10 pages, due in the middle of the semester.

¥ A rough draft and final version of a 15-20 page term paper, due at the end of the semester.

¥ Three 500 word responses, emailed to me on the day before class, about papers by guests.

 

Tentative Schedule

 

Please note: IÕll be highlighting readings to focus on as the semester proceeds

 

8/29: Course Introduction, Sense-Data

 

9/5: Adverbial Theories

 

Guest: Wylie Breckenridge, Cornell University

 

            F. Jackson, ÒOn the Adverbial Analysis of Visual ExperienceÓ

            W. Breckenridge, ÒThe Nature of Visual ExperienceÓ

           

9/12: Intentionalism and Òthe transparency of experienceÓ

 

M. Tye, ÒRepresentationalism and the Transparency of ExperienceÓ

D. Stoljar, ÓThe Argument from DiaphanousnessÓ

            C. Siewart, ÒIs Experience Transparent?Ó

9/19: Intentionalism and Externalism

 

            A. Pautz, ÒSensory Awareness is not a Wide Sensory RelationÓ

            M. Tye and A. Byrne, ÒQualia ainÕt in the HeadÓ

 

9/26: Non-Standard Intentionalism I: Shoemaker

 

            S. Shoemaker, ÒContent, Character, and ColorÓ

            S. Shoemaker, ÒOn the Ways Things AppearÓ

            M. Tye, Consciousness, Color, and Content, selection

            A. Egan, ÒAppearance Properties?Ó

            B. Thompson, ÒShoemaker on Phenomenal ContentÓ

 

10/3: Non-Standard Intentionalism II: Chalmers

 

            D. Chalmers, ÒThe Representational Character of ExperienceÓ

            D. Chalmers, ÒPerception and the Garden of EdenÓ, selection

 

10/5: Short paper due

 

10/10: Disjunctivism I

 

            M. Martin, ÒOn Being AlienatedÓ, selection

            S. Siegel, ÒIndiscriminability and the PhenomenalÓ

A. Byrne and H. Logue, ÒDisjunctivism for DummiesÓ

            J. Hawthorne and K. Kovakovich, ÒDisjunctivismÓ

           

10/17: Disjunctivism II

 

Guest: Benj Hellie, University of Toronto

 

            B. Hellie, ÒFactive Phenomenal CharactersÓ

 

10/24: Epistemology of perception I

 

            J. Pryor, ÒThe Skeptic and the DogmatistÓ

            C. Wright, ÒThe Perils of DogmatismÓ

           

10/31: Epistemology of perception II

 

M. Martin, ÒParticular Thoughts and Singular ThoughtÓ

            B. Brewer, Perception and Reason, selection

 

11/7: Epistemology of perception III

 

M. Johnston, ÒBetter than Mere Knowledge: the Function of Sensory AwarenessÓ

            J. McDowell, ÒCriteria, Defeasibility, and KnowledgeÓ

J. McDowell, ÒKnowledge and the InternalÓ

 

11/14: Epistemology of perception IV

           

            T. Burge, ÒPerceptual EntitlementÓ

            C. Peacocke, The Realm of Reason, selection

 

11/26: Draft of term paper due       

 

11/28: Do visual experiences have propositional contents?

 

Guest: Susanna Siegel, Harvard University

 

            S. Siegel, The Contents of Visual Experience, selection

 

12/14: Final version of term paper due