Epistemology: Knowledge and the Danger of Error

Spring 2012

                                                                       

 

Course: PHIL 6610

Time: W 4:30-6:30

Instructor: Assistant Professor Nico Silins

Office: 219 Goldwin Smith Hall

Office Hours: T 2:45-3:45 or (easily) by appointment

Email: ns338@cornell.edu

 

Course Description

 

A survey of ways in which possibilities of error can disrupt the possession of knowledge and the acquisition of knowledge through inference.  Case studies will include skepticism, vagueness and knowledge of meaning, knowledge of the future, disagreement, knowledge of logic, knowledge of morality, perceptual knowledge, the unreliability of memory and eyewitness testimony.

 

Required Texts

 

All readings will be available on Blackboard or elsewhere online.

 

Requirements

 

¥ A weekly email to me, due at noon on the day of class.  This email should respond to the readings of the week, in roughly 100 to 200 words.

¥ A short critical paper of 7-10 pages, due in the middle of the semester.

¥ A rough draft and final version of a 15-20 page term paper, due at the end of the semester.

 

Policies

           

I will readily accommodate religious holidays and disabilities, but please give me advance notice of any such accommodation you might need.

 

Readings (subject to change)

 

1/25: Introduction

 

2/1: Nozick on Knowledge

Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, selection

Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits, selection

 

2/8: Sosa on Safety and Skepticism

Sosa, ÒHow to Defeat Opposition to MooreÓ

Sosa, ÒDreams and PhilosophyÓ

 

2/15: Safety, Vagueness, and Knowledge of Language

 

Williamson, Vagueness, selection

Kearns and Magidor, ÒEpistemicism about Vagueness and Meta-Linguistic SafetyÓ

 

2/22: Closure and Belief

Christensen, Putting Logic in Its Place, selection

 

2/29: Multi-Premise Closure and Knowledge

 

Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio, ÒKnowledge and Objective ChanceÓ

+Williamson reply

 

3/7: Single-Premise Closure and Knowledge

Lasonen-Aarnio, ÒSingle Premise Deduction and RiskÓ

Schechter, ÒRational Self-Doubt and the Failure of ClosureÓ

 

3/14: Disagreement

Kelly, ÒPeer Disagreement and Higher Order EvidenceÓ

Christensen, ÒThe Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good NewsÓ

Elga, ÒReflection and DisagreementÓ

 

*****First paper due on 3/16*****

 

SPRING BREAK, no class on 3/21

 

3/28: Higher Order Evidence

Christensen, ÒHigher Order EvidenceÓ, ÒRational ReflectionÓ

Lasonen-Aarnio, ÒUnreasonable KnowledgeÓ

 

4/4: Knowledge of Logic

Schechter, ÒThe Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of LogicÓ, ÒCould Evolution Explain our Reliability about Logic?Ó

 

4/11: Knowledge of Morality

Street, ÒA Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of ValueÓ

Vavova, ÒDebunking Evolutionary DebunkingÓ

 

4/18: Perceptual Knowledge, I

Sperling, ÒThe Information Available in Brief Visual PresentationsÓ, selection

Block, ÒConsciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and NeuroscienceÓ

Smithies, ÒMentalism and Epistemic TransparencyÓ

 

4/25: Perceptual Knowledge, II

Stazicker, ÒAttention, Visual Knowledge, and PsychophysicsÓ

Block, ÒAttention and Mental PaintÓ, selection

Carrasco, TBA

 

5/2: Memory and Testimony

Michaelian, ÒGenerative MemoryÓ

Michaelian, ÒThe Information Effect: Constructive Memory, Testimony, and Epistemic LuckÓ

Simons, The Invisible Gorilla, selection

 

*****Draft of final paper due on 5/9 *****

*****Revised final paper due on 5/21*****