1. Dualism

Dualists think that not all the facts are physical facts. They think that there are facts about phenomenal consciousness that cannot be explained in purely physical terms—facts about what it’s like to see red, what it’s like to feel sandpaper, what it’s like to run 10 miles when it’s 15°F out, and so on. These phenomenal facts are genuine ‘extras’, not fixed by the physical facts and the physical laws. To use the standard metaphor: even after God settled the physical facts and laws, he had more work to do to put the phenomenal facts in place. Some dualists think that the additional work involves the creation of a special kind of nonphysical substance. More common these days are dualists who think that the additional work merely involves the creation and positioning of special nonphysical properties, and that is the only form of dualism that I will be explicitly concerned with here. The property dualist’s claim is that phenomenal properties, or at least protophenomenal properties, are among the basic furniture of the world.

Importantly, however, the property dualist does not propose to ignore the evidence from neuroscience. She does not think that the phenomenal facts float utterly free of the physical facts and laws; she thinks they are connected in important ways. Crucially, though, she thinks the connections are merely contingent. They are breakable, unlike the connection between, say, being a cat and being a mammal, or that between the existence of some atoms standing in certain complex relations to each other, and the existence of a composite object like a table.

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1 Apologies to Bertrand Russell for the title. This paper has been evolving for a while. Various earlier versions were presented at the NYU Mind and Language seminar, the Australasian Association of Philosophy conference, the Australian National University, Harvard University, Brown University, Columbia University, the University of Vermont, the University of California Davis, the Metaphysics of Science workshop at Birmingham University. Thanks to everyone, particularly to the Corridor reading group, Dave Chalmers, Tyler Doggett, Derk Pereboom, Daniel Stoljar, and Ted Sider for extensive discussion. Thanks also to Selim Berker, Ned Block, Hartry Field, Kit Fine, Michael Glanzberg, Paul Griffiths, Thomas Nagel, Nick Shea, and Susanna Siegel for helpful comments. Finally, I’d particularly like to thank the unnamed person who got me started thinking about this paper by remarking, “But I’m a dualist! I can say anything I want!”

2 See Block 1995 on the distinction between what he calls ‘access consciousness’ and ‘phenomenal consciousness’. I will usually just say ‘consciousness’, but it is the latter I have in mind.

3 Of course, not everyone believes in composite objects; some instead endorse what has come to be known as ‘compositional nihilism’ (including, to varying degrees, van Inwagen 1990, Merricks 2001, and Dorr and Rosen
crucial difference from the physicalist, who does think the connections are necessary in just that way. The physicalist thinks that the combination of the physical facts and the physical laws necessitate the phenomenal facts. The dualist, in contrast, thinks that phenomenal properties emerge from their physical bases in some sort of causal or quasi-causal fashion. That is how the property dualist maintains a reasonable respect for the physical sciences, while simultaneously claiming that phenomenal properties are genuinely new additions to the world.

Most contemporary property dualists—at any rate, the ones who are my primary target in this paper—motivate their view by appeal to a family of arguments that are, in the first instance, arguments against physicalism. What I have in mind are the conceivability argument (Descartes 1641, Kirk 1974, 1996, Kripke 1980, Chalmers 1996), the knowledge argument (Nagel 1974, Jackson 1982), and the more general issue that lies in the background of both—the explanatory gap. Both the knowledge argument and the conceivability argument are largely driven by the fact that we don’t seem to have any idea how the massively complicated pattern of electrochemical activity in my brain could possibly account for what it’s like to see red, or feel sandpaper, etc. As Joseph Levine puts it, “there seems to be no discernible connection between the physical description and the mental one, and thus no explanation of the latter in terms of the former” (2001, 77). Tell us all the neuroscience you like; it’s still a mystery why that is what red looks like. That is why we can apparently conceive of zombies, and why it seems compelling to say that Mary learns something new when she emerges from her black-and-white room. Though the details of the particular arguments differ, the upshot is the same—it is a mistake to think that consciousness can be explained in physical terms.

2. What is wrong with dualism?

As the title indicates, I am not a dualist. Why am I not a dualist? One way to answer that question would be to lay out what I take to be the problems with the arguments for dualism that I have just sketched. Much of the recent discussion in this area has been about where exactly

2002). But very nearly everyone, including these nihilists, denies that the principles that link simples arranged in certain ways to composite objects are contingent. Nihilists think such principles are not just false but necessarily false. Indeed, until recently I would have said that no one thinks that the atoms standing in those relations constitute a table in the actual world, but fail to in some other world. I would have said that no one, on any side of the debate, believes in what I hereby dub ‘mereological zombies’ or perhaps ‘compies’. In unpublished work, however, both Josh Parsons and Ross Cameron have recently come out in favor of the contingency of composition, and now I can only say that no one should believe in compie worlds.
those arguments go awry, and this has yielded a lot of fruitful work on the relationship between conceivability and possibility, on the nature of phenomenal concepts, and the like. However, I want to stick with the question of what is wrong with dualism itself. Instead of explaining why I am not convinced by the arguments for dualism, I want to discuss why I am committed to finding fault with them in the first place. This seems to me to be a rather important task. I do not want my physicalism to be an article of faith.

Unfortunately, it is closer to an article of faith than most of us are willing to admit. The sad truth is that the arguments against dualism are not really all that compelling. Consider, for example, the argument from simplicity—that we should make do with as little as possible, and not multiply entities beyond necessity (e.g. Smart 1959). This is not going to convince the dualist, who will quite justifiably claim that she is making do with as little as possible. The dualist thinks that making sense of the world requires postulating irreducible phenomenal properties. Appealing to simplicity here requires having independent reason to think that she is wrong about that. Unfortunately, then, the appeal to simplicity is just circular. We need to already have reason to think that the physical facts are sufficient for all the facts before we are entitled to shave with Ockham’s razor (c.f. Kim 2005, 125-126).

A second argument against dualism might be called the ‘argument from optimistic metainduction.’¹⁴ Science has always managed to make do without before. It has never before needed to postulate irreducible nonphysical properties to solve tricky, long-lasting problems, so why here, in this one isolated instance? But even if the dualist grants the premise, this argument is not going to convince her either. She will again say that consciousness is different, consciousness is weird, and that there is every reason to think that it requires special treatment. It is therefore hard to see how this appeal to the success of science fares much better than an appeal to simplicity.

A third argument against dualism is the argument from causal exclusion. If the mental is truly distinct from the physical, how can it have nonoverdeterministic causal power without violating the completeness of physics? Some would say that the nonreductive physicalist has just as much trouble answering this question as the dualist does (e.g. Kim 1989, 1993, 1998; Crane 2001), but they are wrong; nonreductive physicalists have a very plausible solution that

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¹⁴ I owe the name to David Baker; it is of course a pun on the “argument from pessimistic metainduction” against scientific realism.
dualists cannot properly motivate (see my 2003, forthcoming a). Nonetheless, the fact is that it is not clear that dualists need to care as much as physicalists about allowing the mental to have nonoverdeterministic causal power without violating the completeness of physics. After all, it is not clear that dualists need to think that physics is causally complete.\textsuperscript{5} Consequently, they can duck out of the exclusion problem altogether if they choose. We physicalists like the exclusion problem because it gets us from the completeness of physics to physicalism proper; it provides the crucial bridge between the two. Unfortunately, though, it is not entirely obvious why we should think that any dualist would want to get on the bridge in the first place.\textsuperscript{6}

Now, I am not saying that none of those three arguments has any force at all. I do think the exclusion problem has some force, and that it is important that we be clear that it has far more force against a dualist than against a nonreductive physicalist (see forthcoming). But all told, we physicalists are perhaps not in as good a position as we like to think. Forget about responding to objections to our view; why do we hold it in the first place? What entitles us to our rejection of dualism? Why am I not a dualist?

What I want to do in this paper is explore a new answer to that question.\textsuperscript{7} Presumably it will not be exactly knockdown, either, but at the very least it will contribute to the cluster of concerns that together constitute the case against dualism. The new objection is basically this: dualists do not excuse themselves from all demand for explanation simply because they deny that consciousness can be explained in physical terms. They still owe us an explanation of something else—namely, the ways in which the facts about conscious experience (henceforth ‘phenomenal facts’) are related to physical facts. They deny that the phenomenal facts are physical facts, and in denying the identities they miss out on an easy explanation of the way in which the two are

\textsuperscript{5} See Papineau 2001 for an interesting survey of reasons to think that physics is causally complete, including a critical discussion of the appeal to conservation of energy.

\textsuperscript{6} I am inclined to think that the argument against substance dualism from mental causation is in even worse shape. Princess Elisabeth famously charged that Descartes could not make any sense of “how the mind of a human being can determine the bodily spirit in producing voluntary actions, being only a thinking substance” (letter to Descartes May 6/16 1643). But notice that how much force this sort of concern has depends upon what the right account of causation is. The Princess’ objection hits its target if causation requires a connecting process (as in Salmon 1984, Dowe 2000). But it is far from clear that it hits its target if causation merely requires counterfactual dependency, Humean ‘constant conjunction’, or perhaps even probability-raising. Even the substance dualist can say that pains are reliably followed by stimulus-avoidance behavior, that the behavior counterfactually depends upon the pain, and so forth. If he chooses his theory of causation carefully, he can say that mental-physical causal interaction is entirely unproblematic—while treating it entirely on a par with purely physical causation. (See Loeb 1981, Kim 200, author forthcoming b for related remarks).

correlated. They thus owe us an alternative explanation of the correlations. Unfortunately, however, nothing they can offer genuinely addresses the question in a way that is consistent with their reasons for being a dualist in the first place.

The goal of this paper is to try to flesh out the details of that sketch, and to make the objection stick. The core of the complaint is clear enough: dualists owe us an explanation that they cannot provide. This places three tasks before me. First, I need to be as clear as possible about what it is that dualists owe us an explanation of. Second, I need to argue that dualists really do owe us an explanation of it. Third, I need to argue that they cannot satisfactorily provide one. In the next two sections, I respectively address the first two tasks. In the rest of the paper, I address the third.

3. Clarifying the explanandum

What exactly is it that I claim the dualist should be able to explain, but cannot? Not consciousness itself. That is not the troublesome explanandum. I am not complaining that the dualist cannot provide a constitutive explanation of phenomenal properties. I am also not complaining that she cannot provide a causal explanation of particular phenomenal experiences. Let me say a bit more about each in turn.

First, it would be unfair to ask the dualist to provide anything like a constitutive explanation of conscious experience, given that she will probably say that consciousness is a fundamental property (more on the ‘probably’ later). To ask her what consciousness consists in would be like asking a physicist what his fundamental properties—spin, charm, whatever the candidates are these days—consist in. It would simply indicate a refusal to take seriously the claim that they are fundamental. So constitutive explanation of the nature of phenomenal properties will not be forthcoming, but is inappropriate to demand.

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8 Do those who identify phenomenal facts with physical facts have an easy explanation of the correlations? Kim has recently claimed that even type-identity physicalists cannot explain the correlations, titling a section of his recent book “Can Psychophysical Identities Explain Psychophysical Correlations?” (2005, 131-146). That would suggest that he denies that the (supposed) identity of pain and C-fiber stimulation can be used to explain why pain is correlated with C-fiber stimulation.

One of his reasons echoes Jack Smart (1959): identities are supposed to be used to replace or “transcend” (Kim 2005, 136) correlations, not explain them. However, this seems to just trade on the fact that by “correlation”, Smart clearly meant “mere correlation”—i.e., a correlation not backed up by an identity claim (1959, 61). Most of the rest of Kim’s discussion is less about using identities to explain correlations than about when explanatory success justifies the inference from mere correlation to identity, and about the legitimacy of the schema, “we have explained why X is F, because X=Y, and we have an explanation of why Y is F” (2005, 136). I am instead interested in whether the fact that X=Y can be used to explain why X and Y are correlated. I do not see why not.
Second, I think it is at least arguable that the dualist can provide causal explanations of particular experiences, such as the itchy sensation on my elbow right now. She can tell a causal story about why I am in physical state $P$, and then cite a law to the effect that $P$-type physical states give rise to itchy sensations in the elbow. The legitimacy of this is of course debatable. Does it really count as a causal explanation of my itchy sensation, rather than a mere inductive prediction of it? I do not know, but am willing to grant that it does. Instead, what I want to pursue is this. Any doubt about whether the dualist really is causally explaining particular conscious experiences is due to doubt about whether she is doing anything explanatory when she appeals to laws of the form: $P$-type physical processes give rise to $E$-type experiences. I want to focus my attention on these psychophysical correlations. They are what I claim the dualist should be able to tell a distinctive story about, but cannot.

Bear this in mind throughout. The clarification matters, because it means that I am not trying to make a straightforward ‘parity of reasons’ point along the lines of Churchland 1985 and Lewis 1988. I am not accusing the dualist of being unable to explain the very same phenomenon that she accuses the physicalist of being unable to explain. Instead, I am criticizing her for failing to account for a different explanandum—namely, the correlations between the physical and the phenomenal.

Everyone agrees that there are lots of such correlations, although what exactly they are is of course an empirical question. Scientists need to do MRI scans, lesion studies, and so forth in order to figure out the ‘neural correlates of consciousness’. My question for the dualist is why there are any neural correlates of consciousness in the first place. What will she say about why these interesting psychophysical correlations hold? Why is this physical process accompanied by an itchy sensation in my elbow, and that physical process by a sharp pain? Why does orange juice always taste one way to me when I first get up, and another rather different way after I brush my teeth? Changes to the chemical environment in my mouth have a very reliable and replicable effect on the way orange juice tastes to me, and the ingestion of certain chemicals has

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9 In response to Jackson’s knowledge argument, both Churchland and Lewis pointed out that piping dualist lectures into the black and white room would not help Mary any more than her neuroscience textbooks. The immediate point of this is to claim that the knowledge argument is not a particular problem for physicalism. But the somewhat downstream suggestion is that dualists cannot explain consciousness either. I realize the dualist doesn’t exactly want to, and instead am accusing the dualist of being unable to explain the correlations between consciousness and the physical.
a reliable and replicable effect on the way a pain feels. Why is that? Why do these correlations hold?

Do not be misled into thinking that this question is unfair, or that the dualist has already answered it. While she does indeed have a straightforward answer to the question, “why and how do the physical facts entail/guarantee/explain the phenomenal ones?”—namely, “they don’t”—that is clearly not the only question in the ballpark. Another important one is “why and how do the physical facts causally generate or otherwise give rise to the phenomenal facts?” or even just “why and how are the phenomenal facts systematically correlated with the physical facts?” That is, the dualist does think that there is some interesting non-necessitation relation R that systematically holds between the physical and the phenomenal. Whatever exactly R is, we can ask why and how the phenomenal facts are connected to the physical facts by R.

This is where the action is. It is, for my purposes, the troublesome explanandum. It is also precisely the question of how consciousness arises from the physical—what David Chalmers, the main contemporary proponent of property dualism, has called ‘the hard problem’ (1995, 1996).

4. That the dualist really does owe us an answer

The dualist has two basic options here. First, she could fall utterly silent, and claim that the hard problem is somehow “miscast” (Mills 1996, 115). Not only can we not explain consciousness in physical terms, we cannot even begin to get anywhere with the question of how consciousness arises from the physical. Second, she could claim that in one way or another, she can offer a distinctive answer of her own—that her dualism gives her further tools with which to address the mysteries of conscious experience. As I have already suggested, my claim will be that the first position is not plausible, but that the dualist simply does not have any distinctive tools to offer. She owes us help, but her toolbox is empty.

So why can’t the dualist just fall silent? Why can’t she simply say that all of the correlations between the physical and the phenomenal hold as a matter of brute fact? Simply as a preliminary point, note that they simply do not look brute. There clearly is a felt mystery about why those correlations hold. Asking why orange juice tastes the way it does to me—why the physical processes in my mouth and brain caused by that particular chemical compound yield that particular taste sensation—feels like a perfectly legitimate question. It does not feel like an
inappropriate demand for an explanation of a fundamental law; it does not seem to be on a par with asking why F=ma, or why e=mc².

Indeed, Robert Adams takes the demand for explanation to be so pressing, even assuming the failure of physicalism, that he uses it as the basis of an argument for the existence of God. He asks, “why does sugar taste the way it does (and not the way salt does)? … why does sugar taste today the way it did yesterday?… why are phenomenal qualia correlated as they are with physical properties?” (1992, 225-226). He argues that there has to be an answer, that physicalism won’t provide it, and that the only alternative is theism. Now, I reject his conclusion, and I disagree with his rejection of physicalism, but I fully endorse the thought that it is unacceptably mysterious to refuse to answer the question about why consciousness is correlated with the physical in the ways that it is.

There is a simple reason why it feels unacceptably mysterious. To refuse to answer the question at all is to say that every single psychophysical correlation holds as a matter of brute fact. And that is an awful lot of brute correlations. Physical process P is reliably accompanied by a sweet taste. Quite similar physical process P* is reliably accompanied by a slightly less sweet taste. And so forth… It would be very strange indeed if each such correlation were a fundamental law! That would commit the dualist to an enormous stock of fundamental laws and properties beyond those that the physicalist endorses.

Further, note the following crucial point: the dualist certainly need not think that every single correlation between the physical and the phenomenal is brute. The claim that consciousness is a fundamental property does not entail that all of the laws and generalizations about it, nor all the particular occurrences of it, are fundamental as well. Some of the laws will be fundamental, and some will surely be derived. Consider an analogy with gravity, currently believed to be one of the three or four fundamental forces. The fact that gravity is a fundamental force and that there are fundamental laws about it does not entail that every generalization about gravity is fundamental. Claims about the behavior of objects with mass 1 kilogram in the Earth’s gravitational field are not fundamental, for example. Such generalizations are derived from more fundamental laws. Similarly for generalizations about the correlations between patterns of neural activity and phenomenal experience. There is no more reason to think that claims like

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10 He takes himself to be following both John Locke (1690, Book IV, Chapter X) and Richard Swinburne (1979). Thanks to Tyler Doggett for directing my attention to this interesting paper.
physical processes of type P are accompanied by flavor sensation of type F” are fundamental than there is to think that claims like “a 6 cm$^3$ piece of lead weighs such-and-such on the moon” are.

Consequently, it is deeply implausible for the dualist to fall silent about all of the connections between the physical and the phenomenal. She will fall silent about some, perhaps, but she owes us an explanation of others—of what I shall call the ‘macro-correlations’ between roughly neural level physical facts and phenomenal facts. Macro-correlations are claims like ‘P-type processes are correlated with searing pain’ or ‘Q-type processes are accompanied by the smell of dust’. Laws of this form are not fundamental; they are derived and in need of explanation. This means that the dualist does need to provide at least a partial answer to the ‘hard problem’. It also suggests a natural way for her to go about doing this. She should try to explain how consciousness arises from the physical by appeal to a relatively small set of fundamental laws.

This is Chalmers’ own strategy. He agrees with everything I have just said (see particularly 1996, 124-129; 1997, 399-400), and decidedly does not want to simply fall silent about the correlations. He endorses the second line of thought above. He very much does want to address the hard problem on which physicalism allegedly founders, and thinks that his dualism can help him answer it. He claims that the impossibility of providing a physical explanation of phenomenal consciousness does not mean that we should give up on the hard problem completely, or conclude that “conscious experience lies outside the domain of scientific theory altogether” (1995, 19). Those are not the right reactions. The right reaction, he says, is to look for a different kind of explanation of consciousness. In particular, the right reaction is to accept that answering the hard problem requires going beyond the physical. It requires an ‘extra ingredient’—an ingredient that only a dualist can offer:

Once we accept that materialism is false, it becomes clear that… we have to look for a “Y-factor,” something additional to the physical facts that will help explain consciousness. We find such a Y-factor in the postulation of irreducible psychophysical laws (1996, 245).

A physical theory gives a theory of physical processes, and a psychophysical theory tells us how those processes give rise to experience. We know that experience depends on physical processes, but we also know that this dependence cannot be derived from physical laws alone. The new basic principles postulated by a nonreductive theory give us the
extra ingredient that we need to build an explanatory bridge…. Nothing in this approach contradicts anything in the physical theory; we simply need to add further bridging principles to explain how consciousness arises from physical processes (1995, 20).

The extra explanation-allowing ingredient, then, is a set of fundamental psychophysical laws. These laws are supposed to yield a substantive answer to the hard problem—an answer that no physicalist can provide.

The picture thus far, then, is this. The dualist’s project should be—and Chalmers’ project indeed is—to provide a distinctively dualist explanation of the macro-correlations by appeal to a relatively small stock of fundamental psychophysical laws. The dualist should be able to use those laws to systematize, unify, and explain the macro-correlations. As Chalmers says, “the case of physics tells us that fundamental laws are typically simple and elegant; we should expect the same of the fundamental laws in a theory of consciousness” (1996, 127). The fundamental psychophysical laws do not themselves link particular patterns of neural activity to easily recognized phenomenal states like a sensation of red, or the smell of dust. They are instead simple and general—more like F=ma or e=mc²—and are used to explain those correlations.

5. That the dualist cannot explain the correlations: preliminaries

I am suspicious of the idea that the dualist can find anything here that will help. I do not think that she can systematize and unify the macro-correlations without undermining her appeal to the explanatory gap. In sections 6 and 7, I shall try to make this point in two different ways. The first arises from general reflection upon the idea of the dualist engaging in empirical investigation, and continuing the search for explanation at all. The basic thought is that there is a tension in the very notion of a “naturalistic dualism”—not a contradiction, certainly, but an odd tension that it would be a mistake to ignore. The second arises from more detailed consideration

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11 A quick clarification about how the appeal to fundamental laws or bridge principles is supposed to help. Clearly, Chalmers is not saying that he can get some explanatory mileage out of the claim that each macro-correlation is itself a fundamental law. I have just argued that it would be implausible to claim that each one is fundamental—but it would be far more implausible to think that doing so somehow explains why they hold! We cannot explain how and why a physical process-type P is accompanied by searing pain by citing a brute, fundamental law to the effect that P is accompanied by searing pain. That is not an explanation; that is just repeating the explanandum. Quite generally, one cannot explain a B→A connection by saying that there is a brute B→A connecting law. The macro-correlations are to be explained, not to do the explaining. So Chalmers’ appeal to fundamental laws must involve a certain mismatch between the correlations in the explanandum, and the correlations in the laws that constitute the explanans. Since a correlation cannot be explained by claiming that it is itself a fundamental law, he needs to postulate some other fundamental laws to help do so.
of the shape and structure of the kinds of laws the dualist would be forced to offer. Even if we are careful to take seriously the dualist’s a priori constraints on what sorts of thing might help, we make no progress on the hard problem.

Perhaps it will help to emphasize what my complaint is not. My complaint is not that it is incoherent to think that there is a limited stock of fundamental laws that link fundamental phenomenal properties to physical ones, and that thus systematize the riotous number of macro-correlations. My complaint is also not that it is somehow mistaken to think that fundamental laws can do any systematizing or explanatory work. I think they can, and I recognize that everybody, whether physicalist or dualist, takes some laws to be fundamental. Rather, the basic complaints are these. First, it is odd for the dualist to think both that empirical work can help her systematize the teeming swarm of macrocorrelations, and that the explanatory gap poses a real problem for physicalists. Second, even if we hold fixed that the explanatory gap does pose a real problem for physicalists, the dualist is no better off. Everything that she can offer runs into more or less the same problem.

Let me make one preliminary point before getting into the details of either line of argument. We are about to begin fretting about who can offer what in the attempt to explain consciousness and the macro-correlations. It is important to bear in mind that both dualists and physicalists might want to postulate ‘new’—that is, hitherto unrecognized—entities, properties, or laws to enable them to get somewhere with their explanatory burdens. It would be a mistake to think that only dualists can do so, that postulating anything new counts as the failure of physicalism. Physicalism is not the view that everything logically supervenes on, and can be explained in terms of, the properties, forces, entities, and laws understood by current physicists. Physicalism does not assume that current physics is finished. It is of course notoriously difficult to define ‘physical’, and consequently notoriously difficult to decide what sorts of additions to the stock of fundamental laws and entities are physicalistically acceptable. However, the following seems to me to be a good guideline for deciding that question: if the addition either is conscious experience, or is needed only to make sense of conscious experience, physicalism fails. But if the addition is needed to make sense of both conscious experience and an array of other, paradigmatically physical, phenomena, then physicalism might well be true. For example, it is far from obviously a failure of physicalism to postulate a new fundamental force that explains, say, dark matter, gravity, the surface tension of liquids, and consciousness.
Consequently, the mere prediction that current neuroscience, physics, etc. will not be able to explain consciousness—that something new will need to be discovered—is not itself a commitment to dualism. Commitment to dualism is only incurred when the newly postulated properties or laws have a certain nature. The dualist will take some sort of phenomenal or proto-phenomenal properties to be fundamental, and will postulate new fundamental laws that range over them. The physicalist will do no such thing.

6. Argument 1

First, then, consider the ways in which the dualist is going to search for the new fundamental laws. For now, my focus is simply on the search strategy, rather than any guessed specifics about what the laws might actually be. (In the next section, I will offer some suggestions about what rough form the laws would have to take.) The dualist’s idea seems to be that we should simply continue doing science, but with the appropriately open mind—dare I say ‘raised consciousness’?—that comes from giving up the presumption that phenomenality can be explained in physical terms. Chalmers often talks this way. For example, he says that the “liberating force of taking consciousness as fundamental” is that “we no longer need to bash our head against the wall trying to reduce consciousness to something it is not; instead we can engage in the search for a constructive explanatory theory” (1997, 400). The dualist proclaims her dualism and then dives into scientific research to see what turns up.

I frankly do not see what is so liberating about dualism. I cannot see how it makes any difference at all to the course of empirical investigation. And if it does not, taking straightforward empirical investigation to help answer the hard problem undermines the appeal to the conceivability arguments to support dualism in the first place. The latter of those two claims is probably the more controversial one, but let me say something about each in turn.

Both the dualist and the physicalist have a long hard search ahead of them, and the difference between their long hard searches is rather opaque. The dualist and the physicalist have exactly the same research strategies at their disposal. Both will do a lot of serious neuroscience, and both will pay attention to introspective phenomenology in order to get a better understanding of ‘phenomenal space’. Both will run a lab, employ postdocs, and apply for NSF funding. Their antecedent commitments will not have any impact on what experiments are available to them, or on what they find. The physicalist research project and the dualist research
project do not differ in their methodology or tools, but only in their predicted outcome. That is, the only real dispute is about what they will emerge with at the end of the day. When our intrepid researchers open their laboratory doors several hundred years hence, what will they announce? The physicalist bets that they will announce a solution to the hard problem that only relies upon roughly the sorts of laws, properties, entities that we need to make sense of the straightforwardly physical world. The dualist bets that they will announce a solution that takes consciousness as basic, and invokes new fundamental psychophysical laws. That is the only difference between them. They disagree about the expected outcome of the very same course of scientific investigation.

This puts the dualist in a rather precarious position. The dualist apparently agrees with the (type A) physicalist\textsuperscript{12} both that we are currently perplexed, and that at the end of science we will not be. But it is odd to claim that no long hard search for a physicalist explanation of consciousness can possibly succeed, yet keep faith in the long hard search for new fundamental laws that will enable a dualist to solve the hard problem. This is particularly odd in light of the fact that it is the \textit{very same long hard search}. Indeed, it is hard to see how this faith in the march of science is consistent with the dualist’s appeal to the explanatory gap to support her view.

The dualist is making an \textit{a priori} prediction about the outcome of scientific research. The question is whether she is justified in doing so. She, unsurprisingly, will claim that she is—she will claim that she has \textit{a priori} reason to think that the physicalist research program cannot succeed. That is the point of the conceivable argument, and her appeal to the explanatory gap more generally. But \textit{my} point is that her reliance on those arguments is rendered \textit{suspect} by her subsequent embrace of empirical investigation. If the dualist thinks that scientific research can uncover hitherto unsuspected truths about the fundamental laws governing psychophysical connections, why should she not \textit{also} think that it can uncover hitherto unsuspected truths about the physical? That it can generate a deeper understanding of our physicalist tools?

The dualist is endorsing a rather odd pair of propositions here. She is simultaneously insisting that

\begin{itemize}
  \item the fact that we have no idea how to explain consciousness in physical terms is a problem in principle, and there is no point in turning to science to help us,
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{12} The type A physicalist thinks that any apparent explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal is merely a function of our ignorance, and will be closed sometime in the future. See Chalmers 2002, 2551-252.
and that

- the fact that we have no idea what the fundamental psychophysical laws are is just temporary, and science will save the day.

These claims are not straightforwardly incompatible with each other, but there is a real tension between them. Acceptance of the latter should undermine confidence in the former. The more you can see how research in the cognitive sciences can tell us how consciousness arises from the physical, the less secure you should be in your intuition that no purely physicalist story could ever work. You should not be at all confident that your ability to conceive of a zombie world reflects a problem with the physical, rather than with you. All told, then, I suspect that the claim that anything explanatory can be found empirically conflicts with the dualist’s reasons for being a dualist in the first place.

7. Argument 2

But suppose all that is wrong. Suppose there is no tension between the empirical search for systematizing laws and the reliance upon the explanatory gap; suppose that the dualist is perfectly within her rights to maintain full confidence in her reasons for thinking that consciousness could never be explained in physical terms alone. If consciousness cannot be explained in physical terms alone, either it is itself fundamental, or else some third sort of nonphysical, nonphenomenal property is. However, one of the morals of this section will be that those two options are not really all that far apart. Any dualist who accepts the burden to systematize the macro-correlations is committed to something in the ballpark of protophenomenalism.

Start by supposing that the dualist claims that consciousness itself is fundamental. But what exactly is that supposed to mean? Surely it is not supposed to mean that every phenomenal property is a fundamental property. That returns the dualist to the issue that I discussed in section 4. If what it’s like to see red is a fundamental property, and so is what it’s like to see crimson, as well as what it’s like to see magenta…. we are right back to a form of dualism that has an implausibly enormous number of fundamental laws. The project of explaining the macro-correlations by appeal to a smaller set of fundamental psychophysical laws has been cast aside. But equally clearly, the dualist is not going to just arbitrarily choose a few familiar phenomenal properties, and claim that they alone are fundamental. For example, it would just be silly to
claim that the only two fundamental phenomenal properties are what it’s like to see red and what it’s like to taste a particular single malt scotch. Those two surely do not exhaust the basic ingredients out of which the rich tapestry of conscious experience is woven!

So even though the dualist may say things like ‘consciousness is itself fundamental’, what she must mean is something more like the following. There are a handful of unfamiliar, fundamental phenomenal or quasi-phenomenal properties out of which the familiar ones are somehow built. There are common elements that combine and recombine in various ways to generate experience as we know it. Systematizing the relationship between the physical and the phenomenal is a matter of figuring out what those elements are, and what general laws govern their relations both to the physical and to each other. We can call these ‘protophenomenal properties’, or, if some of the associations of that label are unwanted, perhaps ‘phenomenal minima’.13 They might be properties of very small entities like carbon atoms, or they might be less-than-fully-phenomenal properties of larger entities like brains or persons. I will often speak in the former way, but I officially leave the matter open.

The point so far is that the dualist who shoulders the task of explaining the macro-correlations is committed to postulating some sort of phenomenal minima. That is what “taking experience to be fundamental” must amount to. So can this sort of move help the dualist explain the relationship between the physical and the phenomenal? No. Even these protophenomenal properties, whose very nature would seem to render them specially apt for closing the explanatory gap, are not going to get the dualist anywhere. To see this, let us think about how the story might go.

One obvious thought is that the protophenomenal properties occupy in some sense an intervening level between the physical and the phenomenal, and constitute a kind of bridge that connects them—the property dualist’s equivalent of the pineal gland. On this picture, the new fundamental laws that enable a solution to the hard problem would not be directly between the physical and the phenomenal. They would instead be between the physical and the protophenomenal, and the protophenomenal and the phenomenal. That is, the macro-correlations between the physical and the phenomenal would be given a two-stage explanation that makes reference to an intervening protophenomenal level. First, there are fundamental laws connecting properties like, say, being a carbon atom and special protophenomenal properties. Second, there

13 I owe the phrase to Ted Sider.
are special fundamental laws of “mental chemistry” (Nagel 1979, 182) that govern the
interactions among protophenomenal properties. Put enough carbon atoms together in the right
sort of structure, and they will yield a pain.\(^\text{14}\)

This picture has a certain appeal. You almost can see how the physical gives rise to
consciousness; you almost can see how from certain arrangements of carbon atoms you get a
pain. So, have we an answer to the puzzle? Have we a distinctively dualist explanation of how
consciousness arises from the physical?

No. This view faces a dilemma: either a version of the hard problem rearises between the
protophenomenal and phenomenal, or else a version of the hard problem rearises between the
physical and the protophenomenal. The crucial question is this: just how phenomenal are these
protophenomenal properties supposed to be?

First, suppose that they are not particularly phenomenal at all. This seems like a
reasonable way to go, at least at first glance. After all, it seems sensible to deny that
protophenomenal properties have any of the traditional marks of the mental. Here are three such
marks, which are possessed by standard phenomenal properties like feeling a searing pain, or
having a visual impression as of a leafy green tree. First, there it is something it is like to have
them. Second, they are introspectible; we have a certain sort of privileged access to them.
Third, that access is arguably incorrigible—although I can be wrong about whether I do see a
tree, I cannot be wrong about whether I seem to see a tree. Dualists like to emphasize all three of
these features. They are what make the mental so puzzling. And on this horn of the dilemma,
we assume that protophenomenal properties have none of these features. They are not
introspectible, incorrigibly or not, and there is nothing it is like to have them. But the more we
make such apparently reasonable claims, the more the putatively protophenomenal properties
look more physical than phenomenal, and the view starts looking more physicalist than dualist.
If so, though, we now need a story about how consciousness arises from the protophenomenal.
Now we need to know how certain kinds of fully phenomenal experience—what it’s like to see
red, what orange juice tastes like after brushing your teeth—arise from complex arrangements of
properties that are not themselves fully phenomenal. The explanatory gap has not been closed; it

\(^{14}\) Note that on this approach, consciousness is not itself fundamental. It cannot be given a constitutive explanation
in physical terms—so physicalism is false—but it can be given a constitutive explanation. Hence my earlier claim
that the dualist would only probably say that consciousness is fundamental.
has just been shunted into the space between the protophenomenal and the phenomenal. The hard problem rearises there.

We move to the second horn of the dilemma by deciding that that was all a mistake. Perhaps it is wrong to think of protophenomenal properties as being so similar to physical ones; perhaps they really do have the marks of the mental. Let us, then, consider the claim that protophenomenal properties are introspectible, that carbon atoms have privileged access into their protophenomenal states, and that there is something it is like to be a carbon atom. This move would indeed avoid the concern that we now need an account of how consciousness arises from the protophenomenal. However, it does so at a rather high cost. For one thing, the view is arguably committed to a strange near-panpsychism.\textsuperscript{15} Even Thomas Nagel, who is tempted by protophenomenalism of roughly this variety—at least to the extent that it should be “added to the current list of mutually incompatible and hopelessly unacceptable solutions to the mind-body problem” (1979, 193)—resists the idea that “the components out of which a point of view is constructed would…themselves have to have a point of view” (194). However, panpsychism is not my real complaint at the moment (I shall say more about it shortly). The important point for the moment is that this view, like the alternative, simply pushes the hard problem elsewhere. If protophenomenal properties are so like phenomenal ones, then surely we need a story about how the protophenomenal arises from the physical. More precisely, we have lost out on the attempt to systematize and unify the relationships between the physical and the phenomenal.

Either way, then, the protophenomenalist has failed to address the hard problem. The more similar the protophenomenal properties are to phenomenal ones, the less headway can be made on the project of systematizing the macro-correlations; we may as well take each and every phenomenal property, each and every macro-correlation, as fundamental. And the more removed the protophenomenal properties are from phenomenal ones, the less point there is to postulating them at all. We still cannot see how human experience—genuine, full blown consciousness—arises from complicated relations among such fragmentary shadows of phenomenality.

\textsuperscript{15} The view is not committed to full-blown panpsychism, unlike the next version of protophenomenalism to be discussed. For one thing, the view allows that there are fundamental physical particles that are not constituents of conscious beings, and which do not have protophenomenal properties. For another thing, bear in mind that the fundamental protophenomenal properties might be possessed only by large and complex physical systems—brains, for example. This of course makes them rather different than other fundamental properties, but that is only to be expected.
I suppose that at this point, the protophenomenalist might object that I am not being fair, that he is answering the hard problem—at least in its official formulation. Postulating a third category of property enables him to give us a distinctive explanation of the macro-correlations, of how consciousness arises from the physical. However, this line of thought only answers the letter of the hard problem, not the spirit. The protophenomenalist has a choice. Depending upon how much he takes the protophenomenal to be like the phenomenal, he can either replace the question “how does consciousness arise from the physical?” with the question, “how does consciousness arise from the photophenomenal?” or else with the question, “how does the protophenomenal arise from the physical?” But neither constitutes progress that is more than merely verbal. The spirit of the hard problem—and, indeed, the spirit of the arguments that motivate dualism in the first place—is really just this: how do you get properties with a phenomenal feel out of ones that do not? How does the qualitative arise from the nonqualitative? The protophenomenalist has not yet made any progress on that question. Consequently, it is hard to see why anyone who motivates their dualism by appeal to the explanatory gap—whether in the guise of the zombie argument or the knowledge argument—would feel any more comfortable with protophenomenalism than with physicalism.

There is a better objection available. The protophenomenalist should not claim that the particular story that I have just put on the table does indeed answer the hard problem. He should instead claim that I have not yet characterized protophenomenalism in the best light possible. The right version of the view dodges the above dilemma altogether. The trick is to say that the protophenomenal properties themselves constitute or ground physical properties, and consequently that there can be no genuine question of how the protophenomenal arises from the physical. The idea is supposed to be that there is independent motivation for the view that physical properties and entities can be characterized only relationally, by their causal-dispositional roles (Russell 1927). If such a view is correct, there is a pressing question about what intrinsic properties fill these causal-dispositional roles. One answer to this question is designed to also address the hard problem. If protophenomenal properties fill the causal-dispositional roles, we solve two problems at once.

The resulting view has been called ‘panprotopsychism’, ‘Russellian monism’ and ‘type-F monism’ (see Chalmers 1996, 153-155 and 2002, 265-267; Stoljar 2001). There are various
ways to flesh out the details,\textsuperscript{16} but such choices primarily affect whether or not panprotopsychism really is best classified as a version of protophenomenalism, when the latter is characterized as the view that there is a third class of properties that are neither physical nor phenomenal. I do like to think of it as a form of protophenomenalism, and will continue to do so, but the terminological and taxonomic issues are less important than the view’s central claim—the world is qualitative \textit{all the way down}.

Consequently, panprotopsychism can avoid the above dilemma. Unlike the ‘bridge’ version of protophenomenalism, it does not simply push the hard problem elsewhere. Two features allow it to do this. First, the very nature of physical properties and entities is protophenomenal. Physical properties are relational, dispositional, “structural/dynamic” (Chalmers 2002, 265); intrinsic protophenomenal properties underlie them. This means that there is no gap between the physical and the protophenomenal in the first place, and panprotopsychism dodges the second horn of the dilemma. Second, as long as the protophenomenal cores are taken to have the marks of the mental, or at least some approximation thereof, there may not be any particularly difficult question of how full-blooded phenomenal properties arise from them. So panprotopsychism can dodge the first horn of the dilemma as well.

It is worth taking a moment to emphasize that the panprotopsychist \textit{must} claim that the protophenomenal properties are recognizably phenomenal. One reason is that just mentioned—the view would otherwise be impaled on the first horn of the dilemma. But the panprotopsychist has a further reason, one that does not quite apply to the ‘bridge’ version of protophenomenalism. This further reason is that there would otherwise be very little reason not to count the view as a form of physicalism. After all, the view is that there are rock-bottom features of the world that account for the charge of electrons, the behavior of gases, the hardness of diamonds… and consciousness. This is straightforwardly physicalist if those rock-bottom features are non-qualitative.

Recall my earlier remark that one good guideline for deciding whether or not an addition to our ontology counts as physical is the range of phenomena for which it accounts. If the additional feature either is consciousness, or explains nothing but consciousness, then that is probably sufficient for it not to be physical; if it explains clearly physical phenomena as well,

\textsuperscript{16} For example, the filler properties could be taken to be fully phenomenal rather than merely protophenomenal. Further, the claim could be either that physical properties are grounded in protophenomenal properties, or else that there aren’t really any physical properties after all.
then that is at least a *prima facie* reason to say that it is indeed physical. The panprotopsychist’s protophenomenal properties meet that *prima facie* guideline for counting as physical—they ground every physical property. However, if they also bear the marks of the mental, they meet the sufficient condition for not counting as physical. If the panprotopsychist does not want to be a physicalist, then, he must say that protophenomenal properties are themselves recognizably phenomenal.

As I have already suggested, this is not a particularly natural view. It is clearly rather odd to claim that there is something it is like to be a carbon atom. However, it is hard to see how to do more than trade intuitions about this point. So let us set it aside, and suppose that there is, indeed, something it is like to be a carbon atom. I still do not like panprotopsychism any more than I like the other version of protophenomenalism. It may solve the official hard problem, but only by generating a new one that is just as hard.17

Here is a preliminary objection. Notice that the panprotopsychist is committed to the following claims. There is no in principle difference between me and a carbon atom, or me and my socks. There are differences in organization, and complexity, and the like, but that is all. These are differences in degree, not kind; there is no unbridgeable chasm between me and my socks. But those, note, are claims that any physicalist will endorse as well. The panprotopsychist says that the world is mental all the way down. The physicalist says that it is physical all the way up. Both are forms of monism; both assimilate one of the allegedly different categories to the other. And both, when called upon to explain why my inner life is so much more interesting than that of my socks, will appeal to features having to do with structure and organizational complexity. Consequently, it does not look as though the one form of monism has much of an advantage over the other.

However, it will be objected that the panprotopsychist version of monism has a clear advantage over the physicalist version. Panprotopsychism may agree with physicalism that I have a more interesting inner life than my socks because I am more structurally complex, but it at least manages to say something about how and why that structural complexity *matters* to my inner life. Again, panprotopsychism flicks the hard question aside. There is no issue of how the

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17 It is tempting, but I think ill-advised, to try to raise another objection here—namely, that the panprotopsychist has to deny that zombie worlds are conceivable, and thus has no reason not to be a physicalist. For a nice discussion of the panprotopsychist’s options, see Chalmers 2002, 266.)
qualitative arises from the nonqualitative, because the world is qualitative all the way down. No physicalist can say that.

Perhaps that is right. But do not let the cost go unnoticed. The difference between the physicalist and the panprotopsyhists largely amounts to an inversion in the order of explanation. The physicalist wants to explain the mental in physical terms, and the panprotopsyhists want to explain the physical in mental terms. Yet the latter is just as tricky as the former, and to my knowledge no panprotopsyhists has ever even tried to say anything to alleviate the mystery.

The panprotopsyhists not only claims that there is something it is like to be a carbon atom, but also that its phenomenal character is what makes it be a carbon atom in the first place. It is its intrinsic ‘proto’phenomenal nature that is responsible for all of its causal powers, and that plays the dispositional role associated with being a carbon atom. Its intrinsic ‘proto’phenomenal nature grounds its disposition to bond in certain ways with hydrogen atoms and so forth, in the same way that possession of a particular crystalline structure grounds a glass’s disposition to break if dropped (e.g. Chalmers 2002, 265). I have no idea how this is supposed to work, or why it is supposed to sound plausible, other than the fact that it would be convenient if it were true. My concern here can be construed as an inversion of the standard explanatory gap: I do not think phenomenality is the right sort of thing to explain negative charge and the behavior of carbon atoms. I cannot see how to get the nonqualitative out of the qualitative in the way that panprotopsyhism requires.

So much, then, for protophenomenalism. Postulating an intervening level of protophenomenal properties, à la the bridging version of the view, just relocates the hard problem. Postulating an underlying level of protophenomenal properties, à la panprotopsyhism, just turns the hard problem on its head for no good reason.

8. The final moral

Here, again, is the overall picture. I have argued that it would be quite implausible for the dualist to go no further than postulating an enormous proliferation of unsystematized brute connections between physical states and phenomenal ones. She does owe us an explanation of the macro-correlations. The most promising path is for her to do so by appeal to fundamental laws between other phenomenal and physical states. However, I have provided two more-or-less independent arguments against the claim that she can make any real progress here. First, I
argued that there is a real tension between the dualist’s faith in the empirical search for such laws and her deep skepticism about the physicalist’s search for an explanation of consciousness in physical terms. The former should undermine the latter. Second, I argued that the dualist makes no further progress even if she holds on to that deep skepticism, and searches only for laws that take some sort of phenomenal or protophenomenal properties as fundamental. Even though protophenomenal properties might appear tailor-made for closing the explanatory gap, they do no such thing. The first version of the view that I considered in principle cannot give the dualist any explanatory purchase, and the second dismisses the hard problem at the expense of raising a new one.

Now, I suppose that if I were a dualist, I would get off the boat rather early on. I would deny that I was under any obligation to systematize the connecting laws at all. The dualist who does so—who falls silent, and rejects any demand for explanation of how consciousness arises from the physical—could stop reading this paper around page 7 or 8. I still do not think that this is at all plausible. Dualism is a theory, and should be held to the same standards, like simplicity, as any other theory.\footnote{Thanks to Derk Pereboom for emphasizing this point.} Dualism with four brute laws should, all things being equal, be preferred to dualism with a near infinite number of them. Nonetheless, I think it is the best move the dualist can make; it is more plausible than the alternatives. If the dualist chooses to be stubborn about this point, I am more or less happy to restrict the scope of my conclusion to those dualists who do see themselves as having something to say about the hard problem. If I have at least shown that Chalmers-style naturalistic dualism—dualism that aspires to scientific respectability—is no better off than physicalism, I am satisfied. I would still have shown that the only form of dualism worth the bother is dualism that gives up on the scientific project and standards.

All told, then, matters look fairly bleak for the dualist. Consciousness looks at least as mysterious to a dualist as to a physicalist. It would make for a nice slogan if I could say that the explanatory gap is just as wide for a dualist as for a physicalist, but it would be misleading to do so. As I have tried to emphasize throughout, it is not quite the same gap. The phrase ‘explanatory gap’ as it is standardly used refers to the physicalist’s putative inability to explain consciousness in physical terms. The ‘gap’ faced by the dualist, in contrast, is her inability to explain particular physical-phenomenal macro-correlations. So it is not quite that the dualist cannot explain exactly the same thing that she says the physicalist cannot explain. I am not
saying that the dualist cannot explain consciousness itself; I take seriously the fact that she is not intending to. What I am saying, however, is that there are at least two things that we might want an explanation of, and that they are tied together: consciousness itself, and the ways in which consciousness arises from the physical. In refusing to explain the first, the dualist renders herself unable to explain the second. The physicalist, in contrast, thinks he indeed can explain the first. If he can, the second will fall into line as well (e.g. Chalmers 1996, 88-89). After all, what the physicalist says in response to the first question is that consciousness is physical. It is only because the dualist rejects that claim that she has trouble explaining the correlations.

The rather pressing question, you might think, is whether he really can do the first—whether he can explain consciousness in physical terms. I obviously have not tried to do that here. I have not directly taken on the hard problem. I have not tried to diagnose the error in the zombie or Mary arguments. I have neither argued that physicalists can close the explanatory gap, nor provided a physicalistically acceptable story about why they cannot—e.g., a story about how and why our conceptual apparatus leaves us susceptible to it (e.g. Loar 1990, Hill 1997, Hill and McLaughlin 1998, Levine 2001, Papineau 2002). I certainly have not offered a physicalist theory of consciousness. However, my failure to address these issues is part of my point. Although I am certainly not claiming that we physicalists have no obligation to ever come up with satisfactory replies—by many lights we already have—I am claiming that we have every reason to expect to be satisfied by some answer or other.

Here is the dialectic as I see it. The dualist has challenged physicalism, by means of the zombie argument and the Mary argument. Importantly, however, it is not the case that the dualist has truly demonstrated beyond question that it is impossible for the physicalist to account for consciousness. Physicalism has not been shown incoherent. Rather, the dualist has simply levied a challenge, and the physicalist has a choice about how to respond: he can either cave or resist. There is a real question, I think, about which of those responses is the correct one. This is just an instance of a more general issue. When should we decide to stick to our guns and defend a view against an objection that is not obviously and straightforwardly fallacious? How stubborn should we be? This paper is intended as an argument for stubbornness, rather than as a direct response to the dualist’s challenge. The fact that the same problems just get pushed elsewhere gives the physicalist motivation to resist. The physicalist has every reason to hold fast, and endorse one of the many ways of responding to the dualist’s arguments.
So, admittedly, I do not know the physicalist solution to the hard problem. I cannot yet see how the physical facts explain the phenomenal facts. But I cannot see how denying that the physical facts explain the phenomenal facts makes life any easier. Both physicalists and dualists face versions of the explanatory gap, and retreating to dualism simply raises further questions that are just as hard as the ones physicalists face. Dualism simply does not help. It offers us no advantage over physicalism.

This could be taken to generate either a weaker or a stronger conclusion. The weaker version simply says that because the dualist is in at least as bad a position vis à vis the mysteries of consciousness as the physicalist, no appeal to those mysteries can support dualism. The strong version continues by pointing out that physicalism has other sources of support—ontological economy, the unification of science, and so forth. While the appeal to simplicity may not be a good argument for physicalism on its own, perhaps it can be used in conjunction with the explanatory considerations adduced in this paper. That is, even though it is not legitimate as a direct argument against the dualist, perhaps it can be legitimately wielded in the wake of fact that the dualist is not making any progress. If so, physicalism wins.

While the strong version is an argument for physicalism, the weak version is simply an objection to dualism. Indeed, the weak version is consistent with a certain sort of agnosticism—perhaps the proper attitude is to simply wait and see. Let science take its course; see how our conceptual and empirical resources unfold over time. I myself am tempted towards the strong version, but I am content for now with the objection to dualism yielded by the weaker conclusion. After all, this paper is called “Why I am Not a Dualist”, not “Why I am a Physicalist”.

— — —. Forthcoming b. Mental causation. Philosophy Compass.