

First a few paragraphs of review from previous lectures: A *finite probability space* is a set  $S$  and a function  $p : S \rightarrow [0, 1]$  such that  $p(s) > 0$  ( $\forall s \in S$ ) and  $\sum_{s \in S} p(s) = 1$ . We refer to  $S$  as the *sample space*, subsets of  $S$  as *events*, and  $p$  as the *probability distribution*. The probability of an event  $A \subseteq S$  is  $p(A) = \sum_{a \in A} p(a)$ . (And  $p(\emptyset) = 0$ .)

Two events are *disjoint* if their intersection is empty. In general we have  $p(A \cup B) + p(A \cap B) = p(A) + p(B)$ ,<sup>‡</sup> and thus for disjoint events  $p(A \cup B) = p(A) + p(B)$ . (The first statement follows from the principle of *inclusion – exclusion*:  $|A \cup B| = |A| + |B| - |A \cap B|$ .)

The probability of the intersection of two events is also known as the *joint probability*:  $p(A, B) \equiv p(A \cap B)$ . Note that it is symmetric:  $p(A, B) = p(B, A)$ . Suppose we know that one event has happened and wish to ask about another. For two events  $A$  and  $B$ , the *conditional probability* of  $A$  given  $B$  is  $p(A|B) = p(A, B)/p(B)$ .

**Example 1a:** Suppose we flip a fair coin 3 times. Let  $B$  be the event that we have at least one  $H$  and  $A$  be the event of getting exactly 2  $H$ s. What is the probability of  $A$  given  $B$ ? In this case,  $(A \cap B) = A$ ,  $p(A) = 3/8$ ,  $p(B) = 7/8$ , and therefore  $p(A|B) = 3/7$ .

**Example 2:** 4 bit number.  $E$  = at least two consecutive 0's.  $F$  = first bit is 0. ( $E \cap F = \{0000\ 0001\ 0010\ 0011\ 0100\}$ ).  $p(E \cap F) = 5/16$ ,  $p(F) = 8/16$ ,  $p(E|F) = (5/16)/(1/2) = 5/8$ .

Note that the definition of conditional probability also gives the formula:  $p(A, B) = p(A|B)p(B)$ . (For three events, we have  $p(A \cap B \cap C) = p(A|B \cap C)p(B|C)p(C)$ , with the obvious generalization to  $n$  events:

$$p(A_1 \cap A_2 \dots \cap A_n) = p(A_1|A_2 \cap \dots \cap A_n)p(A_2|A_3 \cap \dots \cap A_n) \dots p(A_{n-1}|A_n)p(A_n) .)$$

We can also use conditional probabilities to find the probability of an event by breaking the sample space into disjoint pieces. If  $S = S_1 \cup S_2 \dots \cup S_n$  and all pairs  $S_i, S_j$  are disjoint, then for any event  $A$ ,  $p(A) = \sum_i p(A|S_i)p(S_i)$ .

**Example 3:** Suppose we flip a fair coin twice. Let  $S_1$  be the outcomes where the first flip is  $H$  and  $S_2$  be the outcomes where the first flip is  $T$ . What is the probability of  $A$  = getting 2  $H$ s?  $p(A) = p(A|S_1)p(S_1) + p(A|S_2)p(S_2) = (1/2)(1/2) + (0)(1/2) = 1/4$ .

Two events  $A$  and  $B$  are *independent* if  $p(A, B) = p(A)p(B)$ .

This immediately gives:  $A$  and  $B$  are independent iff  $p(A|B) = p(A)$ .

In addition, if  $p(A, B) > p(A)p(B)$  then  $A$  and  $B$  are said to be *positively correlated*, and if  $p(A, B) < p(A)p(B)$  then  $A$  and  $B$  are said to be *negatively correlated*.

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<sup>‡</sup> “What is the chance of rolling a die one time and getting a 6?  $1/6$   
Now, what is the chance of rolling a die twice and getting at least one 6? **THINK:**  $1/6 + 1/6 = 2/6 = 1/3$ ”  
(From my nephew’s fourth grade math text ... except the two events have non-zero intersection.) Instead use any of: a) of the 36 possibilities, enumerate the 11 with at least one six =  $11/36$ , b)  $p(A \cup B) = p(A) + p(B) - p(A \cap B) = 1/6 + 1/6 - 1/36 = 11/36$ , or c) probability of no sixes is  $(5/6)(5/6)$ , so at least one six is  $1 - 25/36 = 11/36$ .

**Example 1b:** In the example 1a of flipping 3 coins above,  $p(A|B) \neq p(A)$  and therefore these two events are not independent. Let  $C$  be the event that we get at least one  $H$  and at least one  $T$ . Let  $D$  be the event that we get at most one  $H$ . We see that  $p(C) = 6/8$ ,  $p(D) = 4/8$ , and  $C \cap D = 1H$  so that  $p(C, D) = 3/8$ , and independence of events  $C, D$  follows from  $p(C)p(D) = (6/8)(1/2) = 3/8 = p(C, D)$ .]

**Example 4:**  $E = 2$  boys,  $F =$  at least one boy.  $p(E|F) = 1/3$  ( $E = BB$ ,  $F = BB \text{ BG GB}$ ). Are the events independent?  $p(E) = 1/4$ ,  $p(F) = 3/4$ ,  $p(E, F) = 1/4 \neq 3/16$ , so they are positively correlated.

**Example 5:** now 3 children,  $E =$  at least one of each sex,  $F =$  at most one boy.  $p(E) = 6/8$ ,  $p(F) = 4/8$ ,  $p(E, F) = 3/8$ , so they are independent:  $p(E|F) = p(E) = 3/4$ .

**Example 6:** two flips of a fair coin:  $A =$  two heads,  $B =$  first flip is heads,  $B' =$  at least one head,  $B'' =$  second flip is heads,  $B''' =$  first flip or second flip is heads.

$p(A|B) = 1/2$ , i.e., one of these (HH, HT) satisfying  $B$ ,  
or equivalently  $p(A, B)/p(B) = (1/4)/(1/2) = 1/2$ .

$p(A|B') = 1/3$ , i.e., one of these three: (TH, HT, HH) satisfying  $B'$ ,  
or equivalently  $p(A, B)/p(B) = (1/4)/(3/4) = 1/3$ .

(In each case we can calculate directly in the reduced space of event  $B$ , or we calculate  $p(A, B)$  in the full space and divide by  $p(B)$ .)

Finally  $p(A|B'') = p(A|B)$  by symmetry between flips, and  $p(A|B''') = p(A|B')$  because  $B''' = B'$ .

Note: A minor variant (heads=girl, tails=boy) makes this equivalent to an example from the book *Innumeracy*, J.A.Paulos, p.86.\*: Every family in the town has exactly two children, the probability that any given child is a girl (or boy) is the usual 50%, and a daughter, if there is one, always answers the door. You ring the doorbell of a home, and a girl comes to the door.

- a) What is the probability that the family has a boy?  $p(\bar{A}|B') = 2/3$
- b) What is the probability that the girl has a brother?  $p(\bar{A}|B') = 2/3$
- c) You find a random girl walking around downtown. What is the probability she has a brother?  $p(\bar{A}|B) = 1/2$  (or equivalently  $p(\bar{A}|B'') = 1/2$ )

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\* "Consider a randomly selected family of four that is known to have at least one daughter. One possible way you may come to learn this: You're in a town where every family includes a mother, father, and two children, and picking a house at random you are greeted by a girl. **You're told that in this town a daughter, if there is one, always answers the door.** In any case, given that a family has at least one daughter, what is the conditional probability that it also has a son? The perhaps surprising answer is  $2/3$ , since there are three equally likely possibilities — older boy, younger girl; older girl, younger boy; older girl, younger girl — and in two of them the family has a son. The fourth possibility — older boy, younger boy — is ruled out by the fact that a girl answered the door. By contrast if you were simply to run into a girl on the street, the probability that her sibling is a boy would be  $1/2$ ."

The latter statement (c) is surprising because it contains an implicit random sampling assumption. (He never says that he's excluded, e.g., the possibility that families specifically with two daughters are super-cautious and never let either girl out on the street, in which case the probability that her sibling is a boy would be 1.) There's some additional discussion of this on p.7, after introducing Bayes' thm.

**Example 7:** flip a coin 3 times.  $A$  = 1st flip is H,  $B$  = at least two H,  $C$  = at least two T. Then you can verify that  $p(A) = p(B) = p(C) = 1/2$ , but the probability  $1/2$  events can be correlated or uncorrelated.  $p(A, B) = 3/8$  so  $A, B$  positively correlated (makes sense, since the 1st being H makes it more likely that there are at least two H).  $p(A, C) = 1/8$  so  $A, C$  negatively correlated (again makes sense, since the 1st being H makes it less likely that there are at least two T).  $p(B, C) = 0$ , disjoint events (maximally negatively correlated, can't have both two T and two H in three rolls)

[Note that the notions of “disjoint” and “independent” events are very different. Two events  $A, B$  are disjoint if their intersection is empty, whereas they are independent if  $p(A, B) = p(A)p(B)$ . Two events that are disjoint necessarily have  $p(A, B) = p(A \cap B) = 0$ , so if their independent probabilities are non-zero they are necessarily negatively correlated ( $p(A, B) < p(A)p(B)$ ). For example, if we flip 2 coins, and event  $A$  = exactly 1 H, and event  $B$  = exactly 2 H, these are disjoint but not independent events: they're negatively correlated since  $p(A, B) = 0$  is less than  $p(A)p(B) = (1/2)(1/4)$ . Non-disjoint events can be positively or negatively correlated, or they can be independent. If we take event  $C$  = exactly 1T, then  $A$  and  $C$  are not disjoint (they're equal): and they're positively correlated since  $p(A, C) = 1/2$  is greater than  $p(A)p(C) = 1/4$ . In the three coin flip of Example 1b, we saw an example of independent events  $C, D$  with  $p(C)p(D) = (6/8)(1/2) = 3/8 = p(C, D)$ .]

**Example 8:** Alice and Bob in the library.  $A$  = Alice is in the library between 6 and 10 pm.  $B$  = Bob is in the library between 6 and 10 pm. Imagine that data is collected by tracking their comings and goings by tracking the bluetooth ids on their smartphones (which they've inadvertently left in public mode). The joint probabilities are generally constrained to satisfy  $p(A, B) + p(\bar{A}, B) + p(A, \bar{B}) + p(\bar{A}, \bar{B}) = 1$  (for the four possibilities in this sample space, both in the library, one or the other not there, or neither there). We also have  $p(A) = p(A, B) + p(A, \bar{B})$  and  $p(B) = p(A, B) + p(\bar{A}, B)$ .

Suppose they each average about two hours per night, hence  $p(A) = p(B) = 1/2$ . If those events are independent, then we would expect that the joint probability  $p(A, B) = p(A)p(B) = 1/4$ . From the data, it is also possible to determine the percentage of time they're both present. In the extreme case, the two events might be disjoint and  $p(A, B) = 0$  — for some reason they never coincide. In the opposite extreme, we might have  $p(A, B) =$

$1/2$ , so they're maximally positively correlated and always coincide. For  $0 \leq p(A, B) < 1/4$ , they're negatively correlated, and for  $1/4 < p(A, B) \leq 1/2$ , they're positively correlated. If either of those two cases emerged, it might be tempting to assume they (i.e., the two events  $A$  and  $B$ ) are in some causal relationship, and that one or both people are trying either to avoid or to coincide with the other. But in general when inferring structure in data, it's important to remember that "correlation  $\not\Rightarrow$  causation" necessarily. In this example, there could be some third party or effect exerting an influence on the two of them independently, resulting in the correlation, as in the possibilities suggested in class.

### Bayes Theorem<sup>†</sup>

A simple formula follows from the above definitions and symmetry of the joint probability:  $p(A|B)p(B) = p(A, B) = p(B, A) = p(B|A)p(A)$ . The resulting relation

$$p(A|B) = \frac{p(B|A)p(A)}{p(B)} \quad (\text{Bayes})$$

is frequently called “Bayes’ theorem” or “Bayes’ rule”, and makes the connection between inductive and deductive inference. In the case of sets  $A_i$  that are mutually disjoint, and with  $\bigcup_{i=1}^n A_i = S$ , then Bayes’ rule takes the form

$$p(A_i|B) = \frac{p(B|A_i)p(A_i)}{p(B|A_1)p(A_1) + \dots + p(B|A_n)p(A_n)} .$$

**Example 1:** Consider a casino with loaded and unloaded dice. For a loaded die, the probability of rolling a 6 is 50%:  $p(6|L) = 1/2$ , and  $p(i|L) = 1/10$  ( $i = 1, \dots, 5$ ). For a fair die the probabilities are  $p(i|\bar{L}) = 1/6$  ( $i = 1, \dots, 6$ ). Suppose there’s a 1% probability of choosing a loaded die,  $p(L) = 1/100$ . If we select a die at random and roll three consecutive 6’s with it, what is the posterior probability,  $P(L|6, 6, 6)$ , that it was loaded?

The probability of the die being loaded, given 3 consecutive 6’s, is

$$\begin{aligned} p(L|6, 6, 6) &= \frac{p(6, 6, 6|L)p(L)}{p(6, 6, 6)} = \frac{p(6|L)^3 p(L)}{p(6|L)^3 p(L) + p(6|\bar{L})^3 p(\bar{L})} \\ &= \frac{(1/2)^3 \cdot (1/100)}{(1/2)^3 \cdot (1/100) + (1/6)^3 \cdot (99/100)} = \frac{3}{14} \approx .21 , \end{aligned}$$

so only a roughly 21% chance that it was loaded. (Note that the Bayesian “prior” in the above is  $p(L) = 1/100$ , giving the probability assigned prior to collecting the data from actual rolls, and note that the prior significantly affects the resulting probability inference.)

**Example 2:** Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (DMD) can be regarded as a simple recessive sex-linked disease caused by a mutated X chromosome ( $\tilde{X}$ ). An  $\tilde{X}Y$  male expresses the disease, whereas an  $\tilde{X}X$  female is a carrier but does not express the disease. Suppose neither of a woman’s parents expresses the disease, but her brother does. Then the woman’s mother must be a carrier, and the woman herself therefore has an *a priori* 50/50 chance of being a carrier,  $p(C) = 1/2$ . Suppose she gives birth to a healthy son (h.s.). What now is her probability of being a carrier?

Her probability of being a carrier, given a healthy son, is

$$p(C|\text{h.s.}) = \frac{p(\text{h.s.}|C)p(C)}{p(\text{h.s.})} = \frac{p(\text{h.s.}|C)p(C)}{p(\text{h.s.}|C)p(C) + p(\text{h.s.}|\bar{C})p(\bar{C})} = \frac{(1/2) \cdot (1/2)}{(1/2) \cdot (1/2) + 1 \cdot (1/2)} = \frac{1}{3}$$

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<sup>†</sup> Rev. Thomas Bayes (1763), Pierre-Simon Laplace (1812), Sir Harold Jeffreys (1939)

(where  $\overline{C}$  means “not carrier”). Intuitively what is happening is that if she’s not a carrier, then there are two ways she could have a healthy son, i.e., from either of her good X’s, whereas if she’s a carrier there’s only one way. So the probability that she’s a carrier is  $1/3$ , given the knowledge that she’s had exactly one healthy son.

(The other point about this example is that the woman has a hidden state,  $C$  or  $\overline{C}$ , determined once and for all, and she isn’t making an independent coin flip each time she has a child as to whether or not she’s a carrier. Prior to generating data about her son or sons, she has a “Bayesian prior” of  $1/2$  to be a carrier. Subsequent data permits a principled reassessment of that probability, continuously decreasing for each successive healthy son, or jumping to 1 if she has a single diseased son).

**Example 3:** Suppose there’s a rare genetic disease that affects 1 out of a million people,  $p(D) = 10^{-6}$ . Suppose a screening test for this disease is 100% sensitive (i.e., is always correct if one has the disease), and 99.99% specific (i.e., has a .01% false positive rate). Is it worthwhile to be screened for this disease?

The above sensitivity and specificity imply that  $p(+|D) = 1$  and  $p(+|\overline{D}) = 10^{-4}$ , so the probability of having the disease, given a positive test (+), is

$$p(D|+) = \frac{p(+|D)p(D)}{p(+)} = \frac{p(+|D)p(D)}{p(+|D)p(D) + p(+|\overline{D})p(\overline{D})} = \frac{1 \cdot 10^{-6}}{1 \cdot 10^{-6} + 10^{-4}(1 - 10^{-6})} \approx 10^{-2}$$

and there’s little point to being screened (only once).

(We can also look at this as follows: if one million people were screened, we would expect roughly one to have the disease, but the test will give roughly 100 false positives. So a positive result would mean only roughly a 1 out of 100 chance for one of those positives to have the disease. In this case the result is biased by the small [one in a million] Bayesian prior  $p(D)$ .)

**Example 4:** Simplified version of “doomsday” scenarios:

Suppose you’re told that you will wake up in a random room in one or the other of two large buildings with consecutively numbered rooms: one with one hundred rooms ( $H$ ) and one with one billion rooms ( $B$ ). You are permitted to see what room number you’re in, and then you can use that information to infer the likelihood of being in the larger building  $B$  (assuming the two possibilities are a priori equal probability,  $p(H) = p(B) = 1/2$ ). Suppose you wake up in room 65 (or any room numbered less than one hundred). The probability of waking up in such a room in the large building is  $p(< 100|B) = 100/10^9 = 10^{-7}$ , while of course  $p(< 100|H) = 1$  for the smaller building. Hence

$$p(B|< 100) = \frac{p(< 100|B)p(B)}{p(< 100)} = \frac{p(< 100|B)p(B)}{p(< 100|B)p(B) + p(< 100|H)p(H)} = \frac{10^{-7}}{10^{-7} + 1} \approx 10^{-7},$$

and it is very unlikely that you are in some low numbered room in the large building.

Now consider the large and small buildings to be abstractions of long- and short-lived civilizations, and the room number to correspond to where in the development of a civilization you find yourself. The inference is that it's very unlikely to find yourself at an extremely early stage of a very long-lived civilization, and much more likely to find yourself close to the end of a short-lived one, hence the “doomsday” metaphor. There are more elaborate versions in which the length of the civilization has a continuous set of possibilities (rather than 2), and which take into account sampling from ever-growing populations, but the result is basically the same. It is intriguing to extract the hidden assumptions which seemingly permit getting a result from so little input.

Now we return to the sibling probabilities discussed in the postscript to Example 6 on p.2. To isolate from the social brain wiring used to consider children, consider the analog coin problem. Suppose someone flips two fair coins, and reports that at least one is a head. With the possibilities reduced to  $\{HH, HT, TH\}$ , the probability of two heads is

$$q = p(2H | \geq 1H) = 1/3 . \quad (0)$$

Now the person shows you one of the two coins, and it a head. Refining the above probability based on additional info fits naturally in the Bayesian framework. Using Bayes' thm, we refine the estimate of the probability of two heads:

$$\begin{aligned} p(2H | \text{see } H) &= \frac{p(\text{see } H | 2H)q}{p(\text{see } H)} \\ &= \frac{q}{p(\text{see } H)} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

since  $p(\text{see } H | 2H) = 1$ . The denominator can be expanded as usual

$$\begin{aligned} p(\text{see } H) &= p(\text{see } H | 1H)p(1H) + p(\text{see } H | 2H)p(2H) \\ &= p(\text{see } H | 1H)(2/3) + 1(1/3) . \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

The value of  $p(\text{see } H | 1H)$  depends on the protocol employed by the person who shows the  $H$ .

a) If the protocol is the person looks at the two coins and always shows one with an H (if there is one, which is always the case here), then  $p(\text{see } H | 1H) = 1$ , and

$$p(\text{see } H) = 2/3 + 1/3 = 1 , \quad (2a)$$

and you've learned nothing (you already knew there was at least 1 H):

$$p(2H | \text{see } H) = q/p(\text{see } H) = q = 1/3 . \quad (1a)$$

b) But if the coin shown is instead sampled, say the person always shows coin 1, or more generally shows coin 1 with probability  $x$  and coin 2 with probability  $1 - x$ , independent of the result of the flip. (This includes as special cases all of random sampling,  $x=1/2$ , or always showing first or second coin,  $x=0,1$ ). Then  $p(\text{see } H|1H) = 1/2$ , and

$$p(\text{see } H) = (1/2)(2/3) + 1/3 = 2/3 \quad (2b)$$

so that

$$p(2H|\text{see } H) = \frac{q}{p(\text{see } H)} = \frac{q}{2/3} = 1/2. \quad (1b)$$

This framework makes explicit how the probability estimate is refined based on what one learns from random sampling, beyond already knowing that there was at least one H.\*

A slight generalization of this is the person dealt a two card ‘hand’ from a four card ‘deck’, containing two each of aces and deuces (suppose hearts and spades of each). There are  $\binom{4}{2} = 4!/2!2! = 6$  possible hands:  $\{2^\spadesuit, 2^\heartsuit\}$ ,  $\{2^\spadesuit, A^\heartsuit\}$ ,  $\{A^\spadesuit, 2^\heartsuit\}$ ,  $\{2^\spadesuit, A^\spadesuit\}$ ,  $\{A^\heartsuit, 2^\heartsuit\}$ ,  $\{A^\spadesuit, A^\heartsuit\}$ . If you’re told the person has an ace, then the probability of two aces given at least one ace is  $p(2A|\geq 1A) = 1/5$ , since you’ve excluded only  $\{2^\spadesuit, 2^\heartsuit\}$  of the six possible hands. But if you’re told the person has the  $A^\spadesuit$ , then  $p(2A|A^\spadesuit) = 1/3$ , since there are now three possible hands. But the same is true if you’re told the person has the  $A^\heartsuit$ :  $p(2A|A^\heartsuit) = 1/3$ . So why isn’t  $p(2A|\geq 1A)$  instead equal to  $1/3$ , since it doesn’t matter which ace one has (and it has to be one or the other)?

Again the protocol dependence enters: if, e.g., you’re always informed of the  $A^\spadesuit$  when the person has two aces, then  $p(2A|A^\heartsuit) = 0$ . If you’re told about the  $A^\spadesuit$  with probability  $1/2$  when the person has two aces, then  $p(2A|A^\spadesuit) = (1/10)/(1/5 + 1/5 + 1/10) = 1/5$ , recovering the original result. Other protocols will give values between 0 and  $1/3$ .

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\* Because in particular it can show a  $T$ . For a hybrid sampler, say using protocol a) with probability  $y$  and protocol b) with probability  $1 - y$ , then  $p(2H|\text{see } H)$  will interpolate between  $1/3$  and  $1/2$  as  $y$  decreases from 1 to 0.



Now return to the social context and consider the case of a family known to have at least one boy. Then the probability of two boys is  $1/3$ . But then add the information that at least one of the boys is born on Tuesday. Let  $B_T$  denote a boy born on Tuesday, and  $B_{\overline{T}}$  denote a boy born on other than Tuesday. Simple counting of possibilities now gives a probability of  $13/27$  for two boys:  $6+6=12$  ways for two boys born on different days (6 for  $B_T, B_{\overline{T}}$  and 6 for  $B_{\overline{T}}, B_T$ ), 1 way for both born on Tues ( $B_{\overline{T}}, B_{\overline{T}}$ ), and  $7+7=14$  additional ways for the boy and a girl ( $B_T, G + G, B_T$ ).

For the analogous conventional Bayes treatment of this case, let  $q = p(2B | \geq 1B) = 1/3$ , and  $1 - q = p(1B | \geq 1B) = 2/3$ . The probability of two boys given that at least one is born on Tues ( $\geq 1B_T$ ) is given by Bayes Thm as

$$p(2B | \geq 1B_T) = \frac{p(\geq 1B_T | 2B)q}{p(\geq 1B_T)} . \quad (1)$$

We expand the denominator as

$$p(\geq 1B_T) = p(\geq 1B_T | 2B)q + p(\geq 1B_T | 1B)(1 - q) \quad (2)$$

where  $p(\geq 1B_T | 1B) = 1/7$ , and we will take  $p(\geq 1B_T | 2B) = 1 - (6/7)^2 = 13/49$ , because the probability of a boy not being born on Tues is  $6/7$ . Inserting into (1) gives

$$\begin{aligned} p(2B | \geq 1B_T) &= \frac{(13/49)(1/3)}{(13/49)(1/3) + (1/7)(2/3)} \\ &= 13/(13 + 14) = 13/27 . \end{aligned} \quad (1a)$$

This makes explicit the additional information obtained by pinpointing the weekday of birth: from the terms in the denominator we see that there's an enhanced probability of two boys, due to the increased likelihood (from  $1/7$  to  $13/49$ ) of having one on Tues if there are two. (or equivalently the greater difficulty of not having one on Tues if you have two).

In other words, it's more likely to have two boys if one was born on Tues, because it's more likely to have one born specifically on Tues if there are two boys. But this result of course depends on the protocol for reporting a Tues birth.

The probability  $p(\geq 1B_T | 2B) = 1 - (6/7)^2 = 13/49$  embedded in the above Bayes methodology, eqns. (1), (2), implicitly assumed the following protocol: if the parent has two children, including at least one boy born on Tues, then the parent will always inform that he or she has a boy born on Tuesday. But there are other protocols: suppose if there are two boys, only one of whom is born on Tues, then the parent will always give the weekday of the other child's birth. Then learning that there is a boy who was born on Tues makes it *less* likely that there are two boys:  $p(\text{report } 1B_T | 1B)$  remains  $1/7$ , but

$p(\text{report } 1B_T|2B) = 1/49$  because you only get to learn about the Tues boy in this protocol when both are born on Tues. Substituting into (1) gives

$$p(2B|\text{report } 1B_T) = \frac{(1/49)(1/3)}{(1/49)(1/3) + (1/7)(2/3)} = 1/15 . \quad (1b)$$

So hearing that there is a boy born on Tues in this protocol makes it *less* likely that there are two boys, because you are that much more likely to hear about Tues births when they're paired with girls.

There is a simple class of such protocols in which if there are two boys with only one born on Tues, the parent preferentially reports Tues over exactly  $m$  of the 6 other weekdays when they occur. An example of the  $m = 3$  case would be if the other boy is born on Wed, Thu, Fri, then you'll be told that day, but otherwise (Sat, Sun, Mon) you'll be told Tues. The first case above corresponds to  $m = 6$  (always inform Tues if there is at least one Tues), and the second case corresponds to  $m = 0$  (only inform Tues if both boys are born on Tues).

There is a total of  $2^6 = 64$  such protocols, with  $p_m(\text{report } B_T|2B) = (2m + 1)/49$ . Here is the bottom line: suppose we don't know which of the protocols is being employed. In the case of maximal ignorance (Bayesian flat prior), we assume any of the 64 possible protocols is used with equal probability. The middle value for  $m = 3$  is  $1/7$ , and that is also the average:  $\langle p(\text{report } B_T|2B) \rangle_{\text{flat prior}} = 1/7$ . Substitution into (1) now gives

$$p(2B|\text{report } 1B_T) = \frac{(1/7)(1/3)}{(1/7)(1/3) + (1/7)(2/3)} = 1/3 . \quad (1c)$$

So if we assume maximal ignorance of the protocol for reporting Tues, we learn nothing from the statement that a boy is born on Tues. This is ultimately the resolution to the seeming paradox of why the probability shifts from  $1/3$  to  $13/27$ , just from learning that a boy is born on Tues. ('We already knew the boy had to be born on some day, so what additional information did we receive?'). If we don't know the protocol that determines why a Tues birth is disclosed, then indeed we have learned nothing, and the expectation of the probability of two boys, given that one is born on Tues, remains  $1/3$ . But if the underlying protocol is known to asymmetrically favor reporting a Tues birth, then it is possible to learn something from the report of a Tues birth.