Northrop Frye on comic form and morality

Under this title I’m excerpting some remarks from a foundational essay on comedy of the mid-twentieth century; they seem to pose for me the question in the title. Northrop Frye, maybe the best-known Anglophone critical theorist of the midcentury (he was Canadian), sets out to present a theory of comic form and the function of comedy by distinguishing between ancient Old Comedy (that of Aristophanes) and New Comedy (the comedy of Menander, Plautus, and Terence), and presents Shakespearean comedy as a synthesis of the two. His remarks may give us some handholds for discussion of Much Ado About Nothing and Merchant of Venice.

In all good New Comedy there is a social as well as an individual theme which must be sought in the general atmosphere of reconciliation that makes the final marriage possible. As the hero gets closer to the heroine and opposition is overcome, all the right-thinking people come over to his side. Thus a new social unit is formed on the stage, and the moment that this social unit crystallizes is the moment of the comic resolution. In the last scene, when the dramatist usually tries to get all his characters on the stage at once, the audience witnesses the birth of a renewed sense of social integration. In comedy as in life the regular expression of this is a festival, whether a marriage, a dance, or a feast. Old Comedy has, besides the marriage, a komos, the processional dance from which comedy derives its name; and the masque, which is a by-form of comedy, also ends in a dance.

This new social integration may be called, first, a kind of moral norm and, second, the pattern of a free society. We can see this more clearly if we look at the sort of characters who impede the progress of the comedy toward the hero’s victory. These are always people who are in some kind of mental bondage, who are helplessly driven by ruling passions, neurotic compulsions, social rituals, and selfishness. The miser, the hypochondriac, the hypocrite, the pedant, the snob: these are humors, people who do not fully know what they are doing, who are slaves to a predictable self-imposed pattern of behavior. What we call the moral norm is, then, not morality but deliverance from moral bondage. Comedy is designed not to condemn evil, but to ridicule a lack of self-knowledge. It finds the virtues of Malvolio and Angelo as comic as the vices of Shylock.

The essential comic resolution, therefore, is an individual release which is also a social reconciliation. The normal individual is freed from the bonds imposed on it by humorous individuals. The Oedipus pattern we noted in New Comedy [earlier, Frye has characterized the essence of New Comedy as the attempt of a young man to possess a girl over the opposition of a father or senex] belongs to the individual side of this, and the sense of the ridiculousness of the humor to the social side. But all real comedy is based on the principle that these two forms of release are ultimately the same; this principle may be seen at its most concentrated in The Tempest . . . .

The freer the society, the greater the variety of individuals it can tolerate, and the natural tendency of comedy is to include as many as possible in its final festival. The motto of comedy is Terence’s “Nothing human is alien to me.” . . . . The spirit of
reconciliation which pervades the comedies of Shakespeare is not to be ascribed to a personal attitude of his own, about which we know nothing whatever, but to his impersonal concentration on the laws of comic form.

[Frye identifies a contributory influence on Shakespeare in a medieval and folk tradition of romantic comedy.] This is the drama of folk ritual, of the St. George play and the mummers’ play, of the feast of the ass and the Boy Bishop, and off all the dramatic activity that punctuated the Christian calendar with the rituals of an immemorial paganism. We may call this the drama of the green world. and its theme is . . . the triumph of life over the waste land, the death and revival of the year impersonated by figures still human, and once divine as well.

When Shakespeare began to study Plautus and Terence, his dramatic instinct, stimulated by his predecessors, divined that there was a profounder pattern in the argument of comedy than appears in either of them. At once . . . he started groping toward that profounder pattern, the ritual of death and revival that also underlies Aristophanes, of which an exact equivalent lay ready to hand in the drama of the green world. . . .

The Two Gentlemen of Verona is an orthodox New Comedy except for one thing. The hero Valentine becomes captain of a band of outlaws in a forest, and all the other characters are gathered into this forest and become converted. Thus the action of the comedy begins in a world represented as a normal world, moves into the green world, goes into a metamorphosis there in which the comic resolution is achieved, and returns to the normal world. The forest in this play is the embryonic form of the fairy world of A Midsummer Night’s Dream, the Forest of Arden in As You Like It, Windsor Forest in The Merry Wives of Windsor, and the pastoral world of the mythical sea-coasted Bohemia in The Winter's Tale. In all these comedies there is the same rhythmic movement from normal world to green world and back again. In The Merchant of Venice the two worlds are a little harder to see, yet Venice is clearly not the same world as that of Portia's mysterious house in Belmont . . . . In The Tempest the entire action takes place in the second world, and the same may be said of Twelfth Night, which, as its title implies, presents a carnival society, not so much a green world as an evergreen one.

[In the remainder, Frye completes his association of Shakespearean comedy with “the old ritual pattern of the victory of summer over winter” and with “the death and revival of human beings.” He moves toward a characterization of that comedy as mythic and sacramental, but resists reducing all comedies or all those by Shakespeare to a single plot.]