Regress, Unity, Facts, and Propositions.
Vagueness and Second-Level Indeterminacy. (For OUP anthology on vagueness, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi.)
Multitude, Tolerance and Language-Transcendence.
The Frege-Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism. Forthcoming in Philosophical Quarterly.
On Some Recent Criticisms of the 'Linguistic' Approach to Ontology. Forthcoming in Dialectica.
The Ontological Significance of Inscrutability. Forthcoming
in Philosophical Topics.
Bad Company and Neo-Fregean Philosophy. Forthcoming in
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to the Bad Company objection to neo-Fregeanism in the philosophy of
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Carnap and Ontological Pluralism. ( David Chalmers, David
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The Liar Paradox, Expressibility, Possible Languages. In JC
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Sider on Existence. Noûs 41: 519-28. (Link to
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Characterizing Vagueness. Philosophy
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Neo-Fregean Ontology. In John Hawthorne (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 20, Metaphysics,
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Metaontology. Philosophy
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The Liar Paradox and Metaphysics. In J. Skilters, M. Eklund,
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What Vagueness Consists In. Philosophical Studies 125: 27-60.
Personal Identity, Concerns and Indeterminacy. The Monist 87: 489-511. Special issue on
personal identity, edited by Tamar Gendler and Dean Zimmerman.
Personal Identity and Conceptual Incoherence. Noûs 36: 465-85.
Inconsistent Languages. Philosophy
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Deep Inconsistency. Australasian
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A Vindication of Tarski's Claims about the Liar Paradox. In
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Peter van Inwagen on Material Beings. Ratio 15: 245-56.
Paradoxer: en allmän
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Supervaluationism, Vagueifiers, and Semantic
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The Aims of Logical Empiricism as a Philosophy of Science. Acta Analytica 15: 137-59.
On How Logic Became First-Order. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 1: 147-67.